The paper reviews a series of recent UK empirical studies of short-termism based on rational valuation formulae to clarify the distinction between short-termism in the form of underweighting and excessive discounting of expected returns, and short-termism in the form of investor myopia. A brief genealogy of concept of short-termism is provided which traces its development from the writings of John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith on the management of joint-stock companies, Karl Marx on the contradiction between forces and social relations of production, and Max Weber on the difference between formal and substantive modes of capitalist rationality, to the modern interpretations of Kelvin Lancaster and others based on implicit contracts and game-theory. These modern perspectives are interrogated in respect to the role played by social institutions, norms, and conventions in facilitating implicit contracts between owners and managers, managers and workers, and borrowers and lenders. Alternative approaches to short-termism are then considered, including those based on Myopic Loss Aversion or Prospect Theory, Schliefer and Vishny's Noise-Trading Model, neoclassical models of liquidity premia, and Keynesian notions of liquidity preference. Policy implications are also considered along with options for further research.
of market efficiency, rational expectations and specific capital asset pricing models against the alternative hypothesis that markets are inefficient. Both of these studies find that market efficiency cannot be rejected against the general alternative of market inefficiency, but it can be rejected against the particular alternative of inefficiency in the form of short-termism. In each case, the representation of short-termism as an excessive discounting of future returns, provides a better fit to the data than does a the representation as a pessimistic under-weighting of future returns. The preferred model, in both papers, expresses excessive discounting in the form of a positive multiplicative constant (close in magnitude to the number two) which appears in the exponent of the discount rate term. In other words, excessive discounting is manifest as a discounting of returns after one year at a risk premium theoretically appropriate to returns received almost two years into the future, after two years at a premium appropriate to about four years into the future, and so on. Short-termism as such, must be distinguished from the separate, but potentially allied notion of investor myopia, which arises when investors are institutionally constrained to invest over, or at least have their performance evaluated over a comparatively short time-horizon.
In 1969, Paul Samuelson and Robert Merton established, for discrete-time optimisation and continuous-time optimisation, respectively, that the investment horizon is irrelevant under the assumptions that (1) the representative agent's preferences regarding both risk and consumption-smoothing, can be captured by a Von-Neumann-Morgenstern Utility function; and (2) that the stochastic process representing (log normal) stock returns follows a random walk (ie., a discrete-Markov or Wiener process). Hence, for investor myopia to influence asset-pricing, either the stochastic process must differ from a random walk, or alternatively agent optimisation must depart from the axioms of expected-utility theory. Each of these matters will be reconsidered in later discussions of Prospect theory and Keynesian liquidity preference theory.
A simple, commonly adopted way of thinking about short-termism, as defined above, is to picture excessive discounting as a process of comparing future returns as though perceived through an inverted telescope of disproportionate magnification; with this important admission, however, that the further returns accrue into the future, the larger the inverted telescope used to reduce them in dimension for the purposes of comparison.
It is to be expected that short-termism in the form of excessive discounting would favour investments of a more tangible nature which promise to pay-back their starting capital over a shorter horizon. Perhaps in a more subtle fashion, process innovation could be favoured over new product innovation, and strategies of labour-shedding and asset-stripping could be favoured over long-term strategies of skills formation and asset-renewal. This simple fact, alone, could explain the frequent reluctance of private sector capital to invest in long-term public infrastructure; and where certain public business enterprises are privatised, both the initial short-term success of privatised entities, and also, their long-term failure to ensure inadequate levels of provisioning for asset-maintenance and expanded investment.
A Brief History of Views about Capital Market Inefficiency:
The views of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill will be discussed first, before considering the dramatic bifurcation which arises between the positions propounded by those in opposing marginalist and Classical camps: the views of the latter most forcibly expressed in the works of Karl Marx -the last great theorist of the Classical epoch.
Following an overview of the Marxian notion of Contradiction, Max Weber's distinction between substantively rational, and formally rational, calculative practices will be examined, emphasising the way in which this distinction has been applied to the analysis of adverse forms of managerial practice determined by the separation of ownership from management, and of workers from managerial decision-making.
Smith and Mill on the Joint-Stock Company
In Chapter IX of his Principles, entitled "Of Production on a Large, and Production on a Small Scale", J. S. Mill discusses the advantages of largeness to be derived from both specialisation and the division of labour, and also the realisation of economies of scale both in production and management. The specific advantages of joint stock companies are attributed to the pooling the capitals of individuals or partnerships into a larger capital, taking seafreight as a notable example of such a pooling: "But when, from an increase of population and transactions as well of as of means of payment, the public will no longer content themselves with occasional opportunities, but require the certainty that packets shall start regularly, for some places once or even twice a day, for others once a week, for others that a steamship of great size and expensive construction shall depart on fixed days twice in each month, it is evident that to afford an assurance of keeping up with punctuality such a circle of costly operations, requires a much larger capital and a much larger staff of qualified subordinates than can be commanded by an individual capitalist." (p. 103-104) Mill acknowledges that the conduct of an industrial enterprise requires two distinct qualifications: fidelity and zeal. He makes mention of the danger that management will disregard small savings and small gains, but criticises Adam Smith for his pessimistic argument that joint stock companies would only maintain themselves if granted an exclusive privilege (ie., monopoly) due to "…the superior energy and more unremitting attention brought to a business in which the whole stake and the whole gain belong to the persons conducting it.". In contrast, Mill argues that intelligence and skill can offset energy and "unremitting attention". For this reason, it is of the utmost importance to select a directing head with intellectual and active qualifications: he argues that
[t]he stimulus of individual interest secures the greatest amount of exertion, but that exertion is of little avail if the intelligence exerted is of an inferior order, which it must necessarily be in the majority of concerns carried on by the persons chiefly interested in them. Where the concern is large, and can afford a remuneration sufficient to attract a class of candidates superior to the common average, it is possible to select for the general management, and for all skilled employments of a subordinate kind, persons of a degree of acquirement and cultivated intelligence which more than compensates for their inferior interest in the result.
He also notes that remuneration does not have to be confined to the form of a fixed salary:
There are modes of connecting more or less intimately the interest of the employés with the pecuniary success of the concern. There is a long series of intermediate positions, between working wholly on one's own account, and working by the day, week, or year for an invariable payment. […] In the case of the managers of joint stock companies, and of the superintending and controlling officers in many private establishments, it is a common enough practice to connect their pecuniary interest with the interest of their employers, by giving them part of their remuneration in the form of a percentage on the profits. The personal interest thus given to hired servants is not comparable in intensity to that of the owner of the capital; but it is sufficient to be a very material stimulus to zeal and carefulness, and, when added to the advantage of superior intelligence, often raises the quality of the service much above that which the generality of masters are capable of rendering to themselves. (p. 106) Shortly, we shall consider research which questions the possibility of achieving a complete congruence between owners and managers. But first, we turn to the gloomy prophecies of Karl Marx.
Marx on Credit and the Joint-Stock Corporation
In Das Kapital, Marx referred to the joint-stock company as an expression of the tendency towards greater centralisation and concentration of capital. However, he was less concerned with short-termism as the expression capital market inefficiency than with what he saw as the most fundamental contradiction in the capitalist process of accumulation: that between the forces of production and the social relations of production. In his view, the extension of capitalist relations of commodity exchange and production into every corner of the globe would only serve to intensify this contradiction between the potentially liberating, cooperative forces of technology, and the oppressive constraints of class division and private expropriation. For Marx the joint-stock-company is the very system "…which destroys private industry to the same degree that it spreads and takes over new spheres of production". It functions as "…the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself, and hence a self-abolishing contradiction, which presents itself prima facie as a mere point of transition to a new form of production. It presents itself as such a contradiction even in appearance. It gives rise to monopoly in certain spheres and hence provokes state intervention. It reproduces a new financial aristocracy, a new kind of parasite in the guise of company promoters, speculators and merely nominal directors; an entire system of swindling and cheating with respect to the promotion of companies, issue of shares and share dealings. It is private production unchecked by private ownership." (Marx 1981, p.569) Indeed, for Marx an equally abstract and relentless power of disposition is embodied in the credit system, which "…offers the individual capitalist, or the person who can pass as a capitalist, an absolute command over the capital and property of others, with-in certain limits, and, through this, command over other people's labour. It is disposal over social capital, rather than his own, that gives him command over social labour […] What the speculative trader risks is social property, not his own. Equally absurd now is the saying that the origin of capital is saving, since what the speculator demands is precisely that others should save for him […] The other saying about abstention is diametrically refuted by his luxury, which also becomes a means of credit.(p. 570)
Credit facilitates expropriation and the centralisation of capitals, and
[s]ince ownership now exists in the form of shares, its movement and transfer become simply the result of stock-exchange dealings, where little fishes are gobbled up by the sharks, and sheep by the stock-exchange wolves. In the joint-stock system, there is already a conflict with the old form, in which the means of social production appear as individual property. But the transformation into the form of shares still remains trapped within the capitalist barriers; instead of overcoming the opposition between the character of wealth as something social, and private wealth, this transformation only develops this opposition in a new form. (p. 571)
Weber-Writing in the Shadow of Marx
It has been said of Max Weber, that he wrote very much in the shadow of Marx. For our purposes, this feature of his work finds expression in the emphasis Weber placed on rational calculative practices in a modern capitalist economy. These he categorised into two ideal types-those which exhibited formal rationality (in the sense of a technically consistent and logical mode of decision-making), and those exhibiting substantive rationality (in the sense of a goal orientated mode aimed at ensuring the entity's long-term survival. In his mind, a lack of coincidence between each of these two forms of rationality in modern enterprise is very much a reflection of first, the exclusion of workers from decision-making within the enterprise, and second, the separation between owners and managers in terms of decisionmaking and effective control. For Weber, divergence between these two forms is conditioned, in both its magnitude and detrimental effect, by the specific characteristics of the social structure-institutions, norms and conventions.
These Weberian concepts continue to inform a variety of sociological perspectives into differences in national forms of capitalism. However, they have only exercised an oblique influence over modern economic theories of organisation 3 . Nevertheless, concern about the relationship between social institutions and the capitalist accumulation process cannot be reduced to a mere historical curiosity. This issue is very much alive in debates over the transition from feudalism to capitalism (if not socialism to capitalism!). Alexander Field has recently taken aim at North and Thomas, for their teleological efforts to endogenise social norms and conventions 4 .
The Fatal Flaw in Recent Neoclassical Efforts to Endogenise the Social
Marx saw the transition between one mode of production (feudalism) and another (capitalism) as a process of establishing the pre-conditions for unfettered capital accumulation-first, the freedom of capital to move between sectors of industrial activity in pursuit of the most lucrative returns, and second, the creation of free labour in the sense of being cut loose from the social obligations which constrained it under feudal relations of production.
In their general equilibrium approach to the problem of transition, North and Thomas argue that exogenous factors such as preferences, technology, and factor endowments should be viewed as determining not only more conventional variables such as prices and quantities, but also their institutional counterparts-conventions, rules and norms of behaviour. North and Thomas view social factors as a set "organisational blueprints" governing production (ie., the ownership of assets and disposition over labour), distribution (claims to shares of output and specific risk-sharing arrangements), exchange (rights and responsibilities associated with contracts), and modes of political obligation (obligations to defray social overhead costs).
Social overhead costs are seen to be diverse, covering defence, education, public works, and justice; and also transactions and contract enforcement. In contrast, Field argues that enforcement costs are significantly influenced by the likelihood of compliance, which in turn, 3 However, the works of Williams et al (199 0) are a notable exception in this regard. 4 Teleological notions of capitalist rationality are common to Hegelian readings of Capital as an expression of the sublime movement of the Absolute Spirit (Logos) as it attains an unmediated consciousness (Recollection) of itself as mediated through its self-alienation into Nature (its Other). There are similar teleological notions at work in the writings of Weber, who saw capitalism as an expression of a higher order of rationality than that which preceeded it; and in those of Oscar Lange, who saw socialism as the expression of a higher form of rationality, surpassing the anarchy and wastefulness of capitalist forms of rationality. This form of "socialist" telos is embodied in the notion that a simple transfer of ownership of means of production, distribution and exchange to the Revolutionary State will suffice to overcome alienation and exploitation of working class and usher in new era of socialist harmony. But teleological arguments also creep in to contemporary discussions about the problems of transition from centrally-planned to decentralised private enterprise capitalism-here Jeffrey Sach's infamous rubric about the "short, sharp shock" springs readily to mind.
is a function of past duration, expected longevity, and overall legitimacy. Therefore, an evaluation of future overhead costs cannot be reduced solely to the incentive structure associated with the current set of rules. He observes that conservatives would expect existing overhead costs to fall relative to any new overhead costs which might arise after an epochal change in social institutions. Radicals would expect the opposite to occur: existing overhead costs would be expected to rise relative to the costs associated with a transformation in social institutions.
Field demonstrates that North and Thomas, in their efforts to endogenise labour commutation as a key social norm underpinning the transition from feudalism to capitalism, alternate unthinkingly between a conservative or a radical position 5 . While they recognise that commutation is not necessarily associated with an increasing standard of living, North and Thomas argue that on one hand it was promoted by rapid population growth over the 11th to 13th Centuries (a radical argument based on the view that increased trade enhanced market forces, and made direct labour services seem inefficient), and on the other hand, was promoted by population decline over the 14th to 15th Centuries (a conservative argument predicated on the view that despite the ensuing collapse of trade relations, rising land-tolabour ratios increased the bargaining power of peasants over their feudal masters) 6 .
Field goes on to identify a similar set of contradictions in Posner's new political economy. In his efforts to explain the endogenous evolution of Common Law, Posner focuses on the tradeoff between the need to redefine property rights as resource usage changes, and the need to avoid uncertainty or instability in the notion of property rights, to promote confidence in the rules of exchange. Not only does Field's work serve to demonstrate the currency of these debates about social institutions and capitalist accumulation, but it also serves to question any attempts to render social factors as merely supplementary or secondary determinants of economic relationships.
On the side of neoclassical theory, three alternative approaches have been taken with respect to the dynamic inefficiency of capitalism. The first of these, followed by modern practitioners of game-theory like Kelvin Lancaster, discusses the separation between ownership and management in the context of non-cooperative Nash equilibria, in respective dealings between these two classes of agent. The second approach, adopted by the Austrian School, provides a critique of neoclassical notions of equilibrium and arbitrage, while emphasising the importance of the price mechanism in underpinning adaptive forms of search behaviour. For Hayek, unpredictable innovations and shocks in the business environment preclude the possibility of forecast, planned, or stable adjustments from one well-defined, unique point of equilibrium to another. However, it is also recognised that this perspective has been utilised, with even greater force, to attack the rationality of central planning. The third approach which has a similar pedigree to that of the Austrian School, comes to the fore in the writings of Frank H. Knight.
Game-theoretic Approaches to Short-termism
The first approach mentioned above-game theory-has specifically been applied in situations where there is potential for conflict on the part of shareholders and managers in decisions over the timing of both investment and the consumption of the ensuing proceeds. Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalatos summarise Lancaster's findings in the following way, shareholders "…would prefer to take lower dividends for longer, hence allowing greater investment", but are unwilling to do so in the non-cooperative solution because "managers may simply decide to 'consume' the retained profits themselves" (Dickerson et al., 1995 p. 362) . If managers wish to act in a more long-term fashion, shareholders may refuse to cooperate in rewarding them for their abstention. Each agent must determine the point in time when they switch from abstaining from consumption investing their proceeds to maximise growth in the stock of capital to maximising their rewards. Paying managers partly in shares will cause the switch points between both parties to converge, but a timing gap will still remain as long as not all the managers' income is in the form of shares. The more radical solution is to intervene in the financial system itself and adopt an insider-system more reliant on non-market mechanisms.
Knight on Profit, Risk and Uncertainty
The third approach-Knight's perspective on uncertainty-has exercised the greatest influence over two subsequent traditions: on the one hand, that embraced by followers of Ronald Coase (1937 Coase ( , 1960 ; including members of the property-rights school (Alchian and Demetz, 1972) , those who promulgate principle-agent and transactions cost theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Williamson, 1975; respectively) ; and on the other that propounded by Keynes (1936) and the Post-Keynesians.
Frank Knight defined profit as the abnormal return over and above the normal factor rental income accruing to owners of capital, which reflected a reward for entrepreneurial action in the face of uncertainty 7 . One of his most significant achievements was the distinction between risk and uncertainty:
The essential fact is that "risk" means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of this character; and there are far reaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomenon depending on which of the two is really present and operating.[…] It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or "risk" proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. (pp. 10-20) He also introduces the notion of the confidence agents feel about their estimates of risk and return
The businessman himself not merely forms the best estimate he can of the outcome of his actions, but he is likely also to estimate the probability that his estimate is correct. The "degree" of certainty or of confidence felt in the conclusion after it is reached cannot be ignored, for it is of the greatest practical significance. The action which follows upon opinion depends as much upon the amount of confidence in that opinion as it does upon the favourableness of the opinion itself. The ultimate logic, or psychology, of these deliberations is obscure, a part of the scientifically unfathomable mystery of life and mind. (pp. 226-227) After making the familiar distinction between a-priori and statistical or inductive types of probability judgements, Knight defined a third type of judgement which he called estimates: these judgements arise in cases where objective probabilities cannot be determined:
The liability of opinion or estimate to error must be radically distinguished from probability or chance of either type, for there is no possibility of forming in any way groups of instances of sufficient homogeneity to make possible a quantitative determination of true probability. Business decisions, for example, deal with situations which are far too unique, generally speaking, for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance. The conception of an objectively measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable. (pp. 231) Langlois and Cosgel convincingly argue that Knight has been misunderstood by many commentators due to the tendency to interpret his work from the perspective of present-day theory-particularly asymmetric information and non-insurable risk. They contend that Knight's main concern was less with the difficulty in assigning probabilities to outcomes and more with the impossibility of classifying the relevant states of nature (Langlois and Cosgel, p. 459) Knight addressed a variety of techniques which could be adopted to confront both risk and uncertainty. For one thing, he favoured diversification through consolidation and aggregation of a range of activities. However, when it came to uncertainty, as such, he specifically focused on what would come to be known as the principal and agent relationship. The capacity of agency contracts to deal with uncertainty is most evident in the autocratic nature of the labour contract, which gives the employer a vertiginous freedom to dispose of the employees' energies and skills as warranted by any unpredictable changes in the contingencies of the commercial environment. In Knight's view, other contracts such as those obtaining between owners and managers, managers and supervisors and so on down through the decisionmaking hierarchy, afford no lesser a freedom to deal with unpredictability. Langlois and Cosgel summarise Knight's theory of organisation in the following way:
Because of the non-mechanical nature of economic life, novel possibilities are always emerging, and these cannot easily categorised in an intersubjective way as repeatable instances. To deal with this "uncertainty" one must rely on judgment. Such judgment will one of the skills in which people specialize, yielding the usual Smithian economies. Moreover, some will specialize in the judgment of other people's judgment. As the literature since Coase [1937] suggests, however, a theory of specialization is not by itself a theory of organization, since, in the absence of transaction costs, there is no reason why the division of labor could not be undertaken through markets rather than within a firm. Knight's answer is that the function of judgment is ultimately non-contractible (Langlois and Cosgel, p. 462 ; who cite Knight, p. 311).
Coase and the Coasians
Associated with modern principal-agent theory is the formal notion of an incentivecompatible contract between the principle and the agent: not only do such contracts afford mutual benefits to each party so that they willingly commit themselves to the agreement, but through risk-sharing aspects of the contract, they also ensure that the agent acts in the best interest of the principal. Agents could either be workers acting on behalf of managers who are their principals, or managers acting as agents on behalf of shareholders whom are their principles. It is assumed that contracts are negotiated, monitored and safe-guarded in an environment of uncertainty and asymmetrically distributed information. In this sort of confusing environment, principals have difficulty in evaluating the performance of their agents, because it is impossible to isolate the particular contribution they make from those of other agents, given the vicissitudes of the environment. In the absence of complete information about each person's particular contribution, principals are forced to achieve congruence of their interests with those of their agents incorporating insurance-like mechanisms into the contracts which they offer. Sometimes, incentive compatibility may not be achieved.
One much-debated example, arises in contracts between borrowers and lenders of finance. Because lenders have incomplete knowledge about their clients, they cannot determine the appropriate risk-class-high or low-to which borrowers should be assigned (an example of the so-called adverse-selection problem). As a result, they must charge an average riskpremium which is too low for high-risk borrowers and too high for low-risk borrowers (an example of the so-called adverse-incentive problem). This premium encourages excessive take-up of loans by members of the former class and discourages take-up by members of the latter class. Higher than optimal levels of doubtful debts and non-performing loans must be covered by ordinary earnings realised through charging a higher than optimal average riskpremia; and financial rationing-in the form of unmet demand for appropriately priced finance on the part of lower risk borrowers-is the unintended result.
Another example of social influences over the principal-agent relationship in debt-financing comes from East Asia. Due to Japan's unique system of corporate law, financial institutions are allowed to take large equity and debt positions in the same firm. Researchers have found a significant correlation between the proportion of outstanding debt and the proportion of outstanding equity held in the same firm by the largest debtholders. Significantly, this correlation becomes stronger in firms whose shareholders supposedly have a greater opportunity to engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of debtholders (Prowse, 1990) . Empirically, potential avenues for shareholder opportunism can be captured by a range of proxy variables such as the ratio of fixed to total assets, R&D expenditure as a percentage of sales, and the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. Prowse finds that ratios of debt finance to equity are generally lower in the US than in Japan. Moreover, they are lower still in those firms where shareholders can be more opportunistic at the expense of debtors. He claims that these findings reflect a lower potential for conflict between shareholders and debtors in Japan in comparison with the US.
Similarly, Hoshi et al., (1990) have found "…that Japanese firms in industrial groups-those with close financial relations to their banks, suppliers and customers-invest more and sell more after the onset of distress than non-group firms." The results are similar for firms which do not belong to one of the so-called keiretsu (the Japanese term for industrial groups or conglomerates whose firms are clustered around affiliated banks and linked together through cross-share ownership), but which nevertheless have strong ties with one of the main banks (banks which are the main source of debt-finance to the firm, may also own equity in the firms and may even appoint bank executives to top management positions in the firm).
Exponents of the new institutionalist political economy would question the value of a strict dichotomy between market and governance. Some have argued that countries like Germany and Italy whose systems of commercial law have foundations in Roman law are less adversarial, encouraging mediation rather than litigation, whereas their counterparts in England and America, are more adversarial, based as they are on common law precedents (Arrighetti et al., 1997, Burchett and Wilkinson 1997) . One asserted consequence of this less adversarial environment is the ease with which long-term, mutually beneficial contractual relations can be established along industry supply-chains Closely related to the incentive-compatible contract is the idea of implicit contracts between agents. Implicit contracts are long-standing, informal or "unwritten" agreements based on trust, respect and mutual benefit. In other words, tacit contracts operate between the relevant parties, which, although not formally codified, still meet the incentive-compatibility criterion. Examples of implicit contracts are those agreed to between workers and managers whereby employers offer job security, payment for skills acquired, and long-term career paths in return for their workers' willingness to invest personal effort in the acquisition of non-portable or firm-specific skills (see Shliefer and Summers 1988) . Employers may favour firm-specific skills not only because they minimise the potential for labour turnover, but also because they foster the development of unique forms of technological know-how which are hard for their industrial rivals to imitate, find substitutes for, or displace completely with new products or processes.
As we have seen, another form of implicit contract can obtain between managers and shareholders, whereby each party agrees to work towards a cooperative and mutually beneficial outcome to the game first described in a formal way by Lancaster (see Franks and Mayer, 1990; Kester, 1992) .
On a less familiar note, implicit contracts can operate between the users and producers of technology. Suppliers of technology-systems can gain leverage over their down-stream customers through asset-specific investments in such things as software, skills formation, and embodied forms of know-how. System user-groups which meet regularly to cooperate over system developments can potentially give rise to mutual benefits. These groups can only succeed when system users receive assurance that the fruits of their collaborative endeavours will not be used to their detriment (via the extraction of unreasonable monopolistic rents). In return, system suppliers will need reassurance that they can realise adequate returns from their developmental efforts over a time horizon of appropriate duration.
Palley (1997) has discussed a model in which short-termism is generated by the likely prospect of managerial turnover. In his model, managers are the agents with short-term horizons because they are indifferent to what happens to corporations after they have departed. The significance of management turnover as a potential source of short-termism suggests the need to embrace a more general model than that espoused by Lancaster-one in which cooperative equilibria or implicit contracts between owners and managers or managers and workers can be disrupted either by turnover on the shareholder side (via merger, takeover and acquisition activity), on the management side (via managerial mobility), or on the side of the worker (via employment fluctuations or labour turnover).
The Keynesian Position
It will now be argued that the second tradition, associated with the work of John Maynard Keynes-in developing the asset-theoretic notions of liquidity preference, animal spirits, and the speculative demand for money-achieves a comparatively more profound critique of neoclassical thought than that afforded by the Principal-Agent tradition-but one which can complement or strengthen Coasian interpretations. For one thing, Coase recognised the importance of Knightian uncertainty -eg. the goods and services space can be expanded through innovation and learning. Foss has emphasised the fact accentuates the fact that uncertainty is conceptually embedded in Coase's notion of the open-ended nature of authoritarian employment contract which thereby provides flexibility and superior adaptation to unexpected contingencies (Foss, 1994) . Similar ideas can be found in the work of Oliver Williamson, who has combined Hal Simon's conceptions about the bounded nature of rationality with Knightian uncertainty, the view that economic agents are guilefully opportunistic, and concerns about the effect of asset-specific investments on the opportunitycosts of contracting agents (Williamson, 1975) . However, the specific perspective Keynes took to the issue of short-termism is ably captured in the following well-known quote:
There is no clear evidence from experience that the investment policy which is socially advantageous coincides with that which is most profitable. It needs more intelligence to defeat the forces of time and our ignorance of the future than to beat the gun. Moreover, life is not long enough;-human nature desires quick results, there is a peculiar zest in making money quickly, and remoter gains are discounted by the average man at a very high rate. The game of professional investment is intolerably boring and over-exacting to anyone who is entirely exempt from the gambling instinct; whilst he who has it must pay to this propensity the appropriate toll. Furthermore, an investor who proposes to ignore near-term market fluctuations needs greater resources for safety and must not operate on so large a scale, if at all, with borrowed money-a further reason for the higher return from the pastime to a given stock of intelligence and resources. Finally it is the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public interest, who will in practice come in for most criticism, wherever investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks. (Keynes, 1936, p. 157) In a more general sense, it will be argued below that wherever a situation of contractual and non-contractual exchange arises over whose outcomes risk exerts a significant influence, our understanding of outcomes can be deepened by incorporating Keynesian or Knightian notions of uncertainty into the analysis (see Glickman, 1997-98 for example).
Approaches to Short-termism Rooted in Modern Finance Theory
This section of the paper will now examine various approaches to short-termism which apply models taken from pure finance theory. The first of these, Rubinstein's Option-theoretic model, is employed by Satchell and Damant (1995) to question Miles's empirical findings of short-termism. Satchell and Damant argue that three factors-the autocorrelation exhibited in the series for consumption and dividends, the negative covariance between consumption and dividends, and the frequent inversion of the term-structure over the chosen sample-periodwould naturally give rise to rising risk premia. In response, Miles (1995) raises doubts about the frequency of inversion in the yield curve, and the magnitude and duration of explosive growth in consumption and dividends. However, even if one accepts Satchell and Damant's estimates of these parameters, Miles argues that on their own, they cannot explain the magnitude of excessive discounting, captured in his own results.
Advocates of the Conditional CAPM model (Fama and French 1993) argue that rational calculations on the part of investors of the impact which state variables have over their opportunity set, would give rise to a larger required return for those assets more adversely affected by these variables (ie., D/P, P/E and Book-to-Market ratios, plus the term-structure, and default premia). Therefore, excessive discounting could reflect the need for a 'larger inverted telescope' to view such assets.
In contrast, Shliefer and Vishny's (1990) Noise-Trading Model is predicated on the notion that the behaviour of irrational investors (noise-traders) cannot be redressed due to the short investment horizons constraining rational arbitrageurs (for an application to capital budgeting, see Stein, 1996) . For this reason the prices of longer duration assets whose returns are less certain would be lower due to a rational aversion to mis-pricing. Of course, given the volatility characteristics of equity markets, the presence of survivorship bias and limited sample sets, problems of observational equivalence arise which would prevent a clear-cut testing of the veracity of noise-trading models when compared with their Conditional CAPM counterparts. Bodie et al (1996) have presented a model of liquidity premia which predicts that thinlytraded assets, especially those of shorter duration would attract higher premia at the margin (the latter feature raises the margin for any given return because the given liquidity premium would have to be spread over a shorter time horizon). However, these premia are only characteristic of particular classes of asset, and not of equities in general relative to other financial assets As such, the model does not offer an adequate explanation for empirically observed instances of short-termism.
Prospect theory-like other forms of recursive utility-does not impose the requirement that relative risk aversion and intertemporal elasticities of substitution in consumption are conjointly represented by one parameter in the utility function. Benartzi and Thaler's Cumulative Prospect Theory Model (1991) applies Kahneman and Taversky's notion of myopic loss aversion (Kahneman and Taversky, 1991) to explain the observed equity premium. Loss aversion, in conjunction with a given evaluation horizon, would suggest that a shortening of the period of evaluation would elicit a greater degree of discounting of the prospective returns flowing from higher risk assets.
Finally, it was argued in the preceding section that Keynesian/Knightian notions of uncertainty can be gainfully applied wherever risk influences exchange outcomes. This is no less the case in reference to interpretations of short-termism which draw upon finance theory in its pure form. In accordance with the Keynesian theory of liquidity preference higher liquidity premia would be attached to less liquid assets and those with less certain distributions of return. As demonstrated in Gahdenfors and Sahlin ( 1982) , Heiner ( 1983) and Epstein and Wang (1994) , Knightian uncertainty represents a complement or extension to, rather than a substitute for other approaches to asset pricing. I have argued elsewhere, that real options theory, could advantageously be extended in this manner (Juniper, 1998) . As such, the plausible interpretations of Bodie et al, Benartzi and Thaler and Shliefer and Vishny could all be strengthened through the incorporation of Keynesian arguments.
Concluding Comments
The aim of this paper has been to clarify the causal factors underpinning empirical findings of short-termism in equity markets. The policy-relevance of what has been discussed revolves around the principle that social and cultural factors are an important influence over economy activity, because they can influence the attitudes taken by agents who contract with one another: specifically, in promoting the formation of long-term, trustworthy relationships social norms discourage anti-social predation or rapacity, thereby conferring obvious economic advantages.
In its entirety, the analysis enables us to portray short-termism as a phenomenon which arises from a combination of three inter-related factors; namely, Knightian uncertainty, a breakdown of trust associated with specific forms of contract and governance, and a high likelihood that choices made by optimising investors violate the axioms of expected utility theory. To the extent that policies can affect the second of these factors, they can mitigate the first, and furthermore, significantly mitigate the adverse outcomes associated with the third of these factors.
Epstein and Wang have examined uncertainty in the context of modern asset-pricing theory. Much work remains to be accomplished in formalising the manner in which Keynesian or Knightian uncertainty would influence the formation of explicit and implicit contracts. Here, empirical estimates of the degree to which equity markets in various regions of the world are differentially afflicted by short-termism would help to verify this paper's claims about the role played by institutional factors.
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